UK Defence x Climate Change

Climate change will dictate global foreign policy and international order over the next century. Significant planetary changes are set to occur as a result of historic and current CO2 emissions. It is not clear how quickly humans can curb and drawdown greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to prevent further suffering and mass extinction events on Earth, the lack of clear, decisive and tangible outcomes from COP 26 reaffirms this. Defence stands to win favourable popular credibility by tackling the issue head on, where politicians could be seen to be stalling.

Climate change is a threat multiplier which can and will exacerbate existing struggles and cause new global conflicts with dire geopolitical implications - there will be clashes over freshwater, competition over new territories, climate induced droughts and increased cross border migration. Climate security involves the mitigation and management of the geopolitical implications of climate change, it is intimately and inevitably linked to energy security - which historically dictated the international order.

Great Power Competition (GPC) and climate change are markedly linked. Climate change has been an item on the UK government’s long list of things to worry about; but never as the dominant trend which will frame all other issues. Climate security has been a subset of climate action for at least a decade but is quickly emerging as a larger field in itself. The UK Government and Defence has made some movement towards an actionable climate agenda, but there are significant risks to this progress. The Integrated Review set out the UK government’s priorities for national and international security – to be delivered through thematic and regional cross government sub-categories which UK Defence will play a key part. These priorities include: sustaining strategic advantage through science and technology, shaping the open international order of the future, strengthening security and defence at home and overseas and building resilience at home and overseas.[1]

Global Threat Landscape

The global threat landscape is constantly developing but has undergone significant change over the last 5-10 years with the rapid rise of China, return of GPC and the manifestation of what we in the West refer to as the “Grey Zone” – the testing of the boundary between war and peace as states use a growing range of instruments to undermine and coerce each other. A changing threat landscape calls for a changing Defence, to better deter and counter aggression. The MoD rightly pays close attention to the global threat landscape and tailors its doctrine and concepts of operations accordingly; but what planners may not appreciate is that many of the contemporary threats stem from instability as a result of planetary change.

The global energy demand is trending away from hydrocarbons, towards renewable sources. Although it has committed to net zero CO2 emissions by 2060, China is the world’s largest GHG emitter and is still heavily dependent on coal, which meets over half of its energy demand. Although China has significant reserves of fossil fuels, it is still a net importer of oil, coal and natural gas and has taken steps to protect its continued supply of hydrocarbons into the future. Chinese aggression in the South China Sea and attempts to deny freedom of navigation and passage are centred around protectionism of supply routes; the vast majority of hydrocarbons move through the Straits of Malacca.

As global temperatures rise and ice fields, glaciers and sea ice melt - Russia plans to tap the vast tracts of natural resources like oil, natural gas and minerals, particularly around the Arctic - which accounts for around 13% of undiscovered oil and 30% of undiscovered gas. Russia recognises the strategic value of the High North, as does China. The 30 year, $400 billion, Russia - China Gas Deal[2] will only strengthen Sino-Russo relationships. November 2019 saw an enormous Russian military exercise take place in the Arctic with 12,000 soldiers, 5 nuclear submarines, 15 warships and 100 aircraft. Perhaps the UK policy should be to promote that no nation should tap into these reserves as it contradicts the wider efforts to steer away from fossil fuels. However, while the use of economic levers can effectively undermine national security, if the West wants to genuinely compete militarily with Russia (outside of the crisis in Ukraine), it should match Russian commitment to changing conditions in the high north - Russia recently upgraded its military installations at its northernmost airbase in Nagurskoye, which gives Moscow capabilities to defend its territory and strike Thule Air Base - the US’s northernmost base[3]. This course of action has several significant limitations, the most obvious being the logistical complexities of operating continuously at reach vs an adversary with an established logistical facility within 300 Nautical Miles.

Asia may net gain from climate change in the near term but will be impacted significantly in 20-30 years’ time. China currently manufactures the majority of technologies required for the green energy revolution, is has monopolised flat glass manufacture for photo voltaic solar panels and has dominated the supply of Rare Earth Elements (REE) required for the internal circuitry of panels and turbines. Russia is learning geo-strategic manipulation from China. Russia’s Wagner group is quickly closing in on the Western vacuum being left in African states like Mali, where a recently discovered lithium mine has peaked Russian interest in controlling supply chains of REE. Russia’s behaviour in this regard is a stark indication of Putin’s intention to determine the pace of the western transition to renewable energy to, in-turn, undermine western democratic credibility by presenting barriers to the delivery of green political commitments and legislative promises.[4]

The Persian Gulf, Africa, South Asia and parts of China stand to feel the greatest negative effects from global warming - drought and water scarcity is set to become one of the region’s central crises in the coming years. We can expect the deliberate targeting of vulnerabilities within democratic systems by authoritarian states and malign actors – vulnerabilities exposed and exacerbated by climate change. Drought predicted in Somalia this year is likely to result in the displacement of up to 4 million people. Terrorist organisations like Al Shebab are known to very effectively capitalise on these opportunities for recruitment.

It is highly likely there will soon be a global food crisis. Food insecurity in Afghanistan, Egypt and Lebanon may lead to revolutions. China may feel pain as a result of its agricultural land being unable to support the farming of rice, wheat and corn to feed a fifth of the world’s population, China has recently passed laws to reduce food waste internally in order to position itself on a more resilient position than the west in a climate disrupted world.

Mass migration from the Global South is likely to be fuelled by agricultural shifts and water scarcity; the long-term climate trends will push agricultural land further north. Of significant concern should be the formation of adversarial geopolitical and economic blocs of influence, drawn together by climate change.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine sent global staple food prices on a steep rise, which in turn caused significant economic and political resilience issues for fragile states like Yemen, Algeria and Egypt. Egyptian leadership reacted to the rise in staple food prices by increasing its focus on intensive agriculture to be able to feed its people. The reliance on intensive farming practices further degrades the land and leads to increases vulnerability to drought and wildfires. In order to help tackle these complex 3rd order effects, food security systems should be decomplexified and dietary dependencies analysed to shift the global effort in favour of sustainably farming food with high nutritional value.[5]

As temperatures rise, previously frozen uninhabitable and unfarmable land will be exposed and become useful, Russia may stand to benefit from this phenomenon, but Putin’s calculations may be off. Putin isn’t accounting for the detrimental effects of the permafrost melt like soil instability, landslides, sinkholes, anthrax and novel virus release. In a future which sees Russia as an agricultural power, there may be a strong reliance on Chinese labour to capitalise on the increase in agricultural industry - strengthening the Sino-Russo relationship further. Noting the pledge from President Xi Jinping to President Vladimir Putin during the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics that their new “rock solid” alliance had “no limit”[6].

Globally, around two thirds of the world’s fresh water comes from rivers and lakes that cross national borders; increased water scarcity exacerbated by climate change will increase the occurrence of conflicts for the foreseeable future. Restricted water flows lead to intrastate conflicts where each side accuses each other of exceeding water quotas, which in turn leads to the proliferation of armed inter-tribal clashes over access to water. ISIS was able to recruit more people due to the severe droughts in Sunni areas of Iraq[7]. Control of waterways can translate into hard state power, a dangerous tool likely to escalate tensions leading to the deployment of troops. For example, Beijing seeks control of the quantity and quality of water flowing downstream from dams on the Brahmaputra River - a major water source feeding rivers that flow into India and Bangladesh.

By 2050 there are projected to be 1 billion climate refugees, mainly from Asia and remaining in Asia[8]. This scale of population disruption will cause significant socio-economic upset and shifts to a nation’s domestic political attitudes. For perspective, the Syrian Refugee Crisis is the world’s worst crisis to date with 6.6 million people required to flee their homeland[9] - the climate refugee crisis stands to be 150 times worse. As of March 2022, according to the UN, 2,808,792 Ukrainian refugees have fled their homeland as a result of the Russian invasion since 24 Feb 22[10], which serves as another example of how emotive, escalatory, and disruptive refugee movements can be.

Hardware

The MoD cares deeply about hardware and expensive platforms. Some of these capabilities will not function above a certain temperature threshold, or in extreme environments, think satcom systems, helicopter engines, liquid fuel generators, missiles, ammunition and tanks. Perhaps an analysis of the threshold temperatures reached in key overseas strategic regions of Cyprus, Kenya or Diego Garcia which would start affecting military aircraft movements, or a T45, may be useful?  The MoD should routinely test and exercise in extreme temperature conditions to deliberately appreciate the performance characteristics of current equipment, free of the institutional fear of failure - gaps in capability should be addressed and future equipment procurement must have robust environmental resilience built in. Although this may be a standard part of the requirements and acceptability criteria managed by Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S), do the brochures, statements of requirements and reports genuinely match reality?

Innovating and reducing Defence’s hardware reliance on fossil fuels will increase resilience but will face fierce internal resistance - particularly as many sustainable fuel alternatives are not quite perfect - but will be the focus of R&D investment for the next decade (certainly). Deciding on the opportune moment for transition to green equipment will be difficult - is there ever a good time to accept these risks and be more vulnerable?

The current trends towards synthetic training environments and uninhabited systems do align with the MoD’s climate action agenda[11]. The long, rigorous hardware procurement process is an emotive topic to many inside the MoD, a shift away from large, exquisite platforms with rigid and comprehensive lists of requirements is necessary; rapid iterations from whiteboard to pilot will allow better technology to find its way into the hands of operators. However, noting that Russia unveiled the world's first combat icebreaker recently, NATO should be looking for technology to counter its ability to operate, which may indeed also be large, exquisite, and combat icebreaker shaped – this is a dangerous rhetoric when clearly the UK supports a narrative of protecting the ice rather than breaking it.

The emphasis to move away from hydrocarbon dependency gives rise to another problem - the demand for materials for the ‘clean energy revolution’. Lithium, Cobalt and Graphite are among several minerals essential for the renewable revolution, South America, Africa and Australia dominate the global supply chain for these metals. In addition to these materials, the global supply of REE should be of concern to defence; although their existence in Earth’s crust is not particularly rare, the infrastructure to extract and mine them can take 10-15 years to establish. They are essential for a myriad of defence technologies like satellite communications, radar, sonar, precision guided munitions, armour, armour piercing projectiles and thousands more. The Chinese Communist Party strategically ploughed huge sums into developing China’s domestic REE production infrastructure and established a Western dependency. If our adversaries control essential natural resources for defence equipment, even our “good old” conventional war-fighting capability is at risk.

People

There is an inextricable link between climate change and conflict, both as the cause and the effect. Studies in psychology and economics have repeatedly found that individuals are more likely to exhibit aggressive or violent behaviour towards others if ambient temperatures at the time of observation are higher - ranging from horn honking in traffic jams to the use of force during police training, to domestic violence and assault. Research has shown that with each degree of temperature increase, interpersonal conflict grows by 2.4% and intergroup conflict increases by 11.3%.[12]

UK Expeditionary forces will be required to operate in increasingly demanding environments like the Arctic and in the intense heat in regions such as the Gulf. There are physiological limits to human survivability, which is particularly important for regions with intense dry-hot weather conditions where instability and conflict is likely to break out. MoD concepts of operations, physical training, technology, and medicine must evolve faster in order to deliver wider scale reliable effects at scale in such conditions.

Opportunities

The MoD received a healthy boost to its budget in January 2021 to support the reforms outlined in the Integrated Review - of which UK action on climate change featured. By tapping into the momentum behind climate R&D and becoming a fast follower of green technology, the MoD could build its reputation as a Defence leader in climate resilience and awareness.

Global action to fight damaging levels of climate change is a non-contentious area for international collaboration, not just with traditional allies. Indeed, John Kerry (the US’ Climate Envoy under the Biden Administration) has made strikingly clear that the rift between the USA and China does not extend to their responsibilities as great powers to collaborate to halt and reverse climate change - a climate G2 of sorts. Brexit aggravated old wounds and opened fresh ones between the UK and the EU, but collective climate action can help heal the relationship, as well as prove that the UK is committed to European Security. Climate security may become a new means of political spat; with war remaining an extension of politics.

The UK government enshrined its commitments to the Paris Agreement in law, and the UK is looking on track to meet its commitments thus far having impressively transitioned 47% of its energy demand to renewable sources, with grander plans afoot with Norway to further reduce the nation’s reliance on fossil fuels. The UK’s current rising energy prices set alongside Russian sanctions as a result of the crisis in Ukraine underline the importance of these projects.

Defence is a dirty industry - for many reasons (fundamental fossil fuel reliance, an aging large estate, significant inefficiencies in sustainment). The US Department of Defence is considered the largest CO2 emitter in the world and the MoD, by its own admission, is by far the largest single contributor to greenhouse-gas emissions within the UK central government, being responsible for half of the total. It must loudly commit to reducing its emissions[13], even only on these grounds.

The MoD forms a key part of the UK government’s soft power. Take Op RUMAN, the RAF’s humanitarian aid operation in the Caribbean in 2017 following Hurricane Irma, or Op GRITROCK the British Army’s assistance in West Africa during the Ebola epidemic in 2015. It would be hypocritical if the MoD does not take steps to reduce its GHG emissions, particularly if the UK continues to conduct expeditionary operations designed to stabilise regions made unstable by rising temperatures.

Noting the combination of these factors and their multiple co-dependencies, climate change may be the most formidable and unpredictable adversary Defence departments have ever faced.

As the UK’s Carrier Strike Group sails around the Indo-Pacific and in the North Sea, it’s clear that UK effort is focused on maintaining relevance as a strong middle power in a global order increasingly dictated by great powers such as the USA and a rising China. A closer look reveals that this decision is ultimately climate related; UK Naval Power is contributing to the security of key transit routes (including another likely to open north of Russia as a result of melting sea ice) and freedom of navigation operations against aggressors China and Russia who are heavily reliant on hydrocarbons and are concerned with energy security.

Challenges

Challenges to climate action and interest will stifle the urgency required to enact the necessary approach. There are 2 admittedly large planning and leadership challenges surrounding climate action by Defence; firstly, the complexity of accurately modelling future risks and secondly, the degraded ability of defence to apply strategic foresight to the climate problem.

The planetary consequences of climate change are increasingly precise but explaining how it will lead to changes in international security is highly complex and will demand a fundamentally different way of understanding risks than the risk management practices military planners are used to. But “fail to prepare” means “prepare to fail”, climate instability is a gathering storm - one we should strive to model, simulate and rehearse for. The application of wargaming tools to climate security problems could help identify less obvious vulnerabilities, co-dependencies and relationships whilst simultaneously providing a vector for education and situational awareness.

Resistance to climate change action and the reluctance to plan for it militarily is related to the inequality of the effects. Most rich countries (US, Canada, Western Europe, and some oil producing states) are home to significantly less people who are directly at risk of the negative effects of climate change – because we have the wealth to mitigate the risks. Roughly, 7% of the world is responsible for 50% of all CO2 emissions today. There is an extraordinary geographical unevenness to the world’s at-risk population who live mainly in South and East Asia, between Pakistan and North Korea - a belt of potentially revolutionary change. We should expect climate induced social turbulence to combine in a region with an enormous, growing capacity to reshape the consumption and distribution of the world’s resources.

The majority of UK ministerial and defence planner’s bandwidth has been taken up with UK activity in the Grey Zone (arguably now just “warfare”) and rebuilding and maintaining alliances to have a seat at the table, next to the US for the next carving of global power. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is a stark reminder that although the UK should be reaching to become an AI superpower, it must be able to fight and win on conventional battlefields, alongside its allies.

Even if climate action was pushed higher up the MoD’s agenda, it is difficult to directly compare the urgency of action with other closer, bigger, visible fires to fight. Climate security threats will likely call for changes to Defence capability and structure. Competing Defence priorities are likely to impact the speed and momentum of delivering departmental climate change mitigation and adaption work.

Projections of the number of climate related deaths likely by 2050 are horrifying, but they are far enough away to be filed under “future problems” although these can realistically only be addressed now, and it’s probably already too late. Climate change carries far reaching public health issues including deaths directly as a result of climate effects: storm surges, heatwaves, hurricanes etc and second order effects: waterborne and vibrio infections, poverty, starvation and mental health disorders (among many others). These deaths may not be as emotive as those caused by a suicide bomber or wayward projectiles, but climate related illness will harm and kill the most vulnerable first.

Climate change infuses new conflict factors into the geopolitical environment, elevating geopolitical contests from traditional arenas, charging them with people’s will to survive and making them far more complicated to resolve. The West must challenge Russia and China over climate vulnerable states, but it cannot negotiate from a place of weakness, it should work to use hard power to constrain Russian and Chinese geopolitical strength. The MoD’s commitment to consider climate change and sustainability is a welcome start, and the formation of a Climate Change and Sustainability Directorate to cohere defence’s UK government approach is useful and valid. In order to mitigate against and fight the transnational challenges outlines in the Integrated Review, Defence must increase its focus on climate security. If the MoD is aiming to support the UK to be in the vanguard of countries addressing climate change and sustainability, and perhaps to influence its closest military partners it must champion the importance of urgency. An “epoch by epoch” approach[14] screams slow and steady - when really, to match one of the buzzwords of the decade- innovation, the MoD needs to shout, disrupt, move fast and shift the cultural inertia in support of climate action.

Author: Kate Turner, 2021, Founder and CEO of Vör.earth

References

[1] The Integrated Review 2021 - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)

[2] Weitz, R, 2014, “THE RUSSIA-CHINA GAS DEAL: Implications and Ramifications”, World Affairs, 177(3), 80-86. Retrieved May 8, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/43555259.

[3] Friedbert Pflüger, Feb 2020, “A New Security Challenge: The Geopolitical Implications of Climate Change”, The Atlantic Council.

[4] Olivia Lazard, “Russia’s Ukraine Invasion and Climate Change Go Hand in Hand”, Carnegie Europe, 4 Mar 22.

[5] Olivia Lazard, “Russia’s Ukraine Invasion and Climate Change Go Hand in Hand”, Carnegie Europe, 4 Mar 22.

[6] Robin Brant, 14 Mar 2022, “Ukraine Crisis: US Warns China Against Helping Russia” BBC News

[7] Friedbert Pflüger, Feb 2020, “A New Security Challenge: The Geopolitical Implications of Climate Change”, The Atlantic Council

[8] Geoff Mann, Joel Wainwright, “Climate Leviathan” Verso, 2018

[9] UN Refugees: Syrian Refugee Crisis https://www.unrefugees.org/news/syria-refugee-crisis- explained

[10] Situation Ukraine Refugee Situation (unhcr.org) accessed on 14 Mar 22 at 1149.

[11] B. Barry, D.Barrie & N. Childs, Apr 2021, “Dealing With hot Air: UK Defence and Climate Change” The military Balance Blog https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2021/04/uk-defence-climate-change

[12] S. Hisiang, “Quantifying the Influence of Climate Change on Human Conflict,” Science 341, 2013

[13] B. Barry, D.Barrie & N. Childs, Apr 2021, “Dealing With hot Air: UK Defence and Climate Change” The military Balance Blog https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2021/04/uk-defence-climate-change

[14] Mar 2021 “The Ministry of Defence’s Climate Change and Sustainability Strategic Approach”